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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an 
originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to 
securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator 
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structured finance transaction; the originator holds the mezzanine tranche, rather than the 
equity tranche. These mechanisms will result in differing levels of screening, and the 
differences arise from varying sensitivities to a systematic risk factor. Equity tranche 
retention is not always the most effective mechanism, and the equity tranche can be 
dominated by either a vertical slice or a mezzanine tranche if the probability of a downturn 
is likely and if the equity tranche is likely to be depleted in a downturn. If the choice of how 
much and what form to retain is left up to the originator, the retention mechanism may lead 
to low screening effort, suggesting a potential rationale for government intervention. 
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 1 Introduction
In the summer of 2007, following an extended period of ample liquidity
provision and tight credit spreads, large-scale valuation losses on US sub-
prime mortgages and an associated collapse in investor risk appetite trig-
gered broad-based distress in markets for securitised instruments. Subprime-
related securitisations, in particular, had experienced severe credit quality
deterioration and downgrades of their credit ratings. Losses were magni￿ed
by increasingly dysfunctional markets for many types of structured prod-
ucts, triggering sharp corrections in secondary market prices that eventually
spilled over into other asset markets.1
As the crisis unfolded, it became increasingly clear that investor con-
cerns were focused not￿ or not exclusively￿ on subprime mortgages or any
other particular segment of the credit market. Instead, the crisis was driven
by concerns about securitisation markets as such and by the way the more
widespread use of structuring technology and o⁄-balance sheet ￿nance had
reshaped the ￿nancial sector. Securitisation volumes plummeted in response,
from a combined annual amount for the United States and Europe of more
than $3.5 trillion over the 2005-2007 period to just over $2 trillion in 2008
(see Graph 1). Re￿ ecting the generalised loss of investor con￿dence, most of
this remaining issuance was in the US agency sector and in European secu-
ritisations used for re￿nancing activities with the European Central Bank.
The US subprime and alt-A market, which had peaked at some $815 bil-
lion in 2006, vanished completely, as did markets for many other securitised
instruments.
One issue gaining particular attention in this context was the securiti-
sation chain and its in￿ uence on incentives. This was because, by putting
some distance between originators and investors, the process of securitisation
can weaken incentives for proper screening and due diligence along the chain.
This, in turn, can contribute to a lowering of lending standards and a gradual
deterioration in the credit quality of assets included in the collateral pools of
securitised instruments.2
Concerns like this are not new. It has long been recognised that securiti-
sation, while adding economic value through features such as the tranching
of risk, can also give rise to incentive incompatibilities and other information
1See chapter VI in BIS (2008) for a detailed account of ￿nancial market developments
during the early stages of the credit crisis of 2007/08. Fender and Scheicher (2009) review
the performance of subprime mortgage securitisations and related derivatives.
2See, for example, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2007), Keys et al (2008), and Mian and
Su￿ (2008). Gorton (2008) o⁄ers a somewhat contrarian view.
2
1problems.3 In particular, compared to the relationship between individual
borrowers and lenders, securitisation relies on a diverse group of originators,
servicers, arrangers and investors who are linked through a complex network
of relationships. The e¢ ciency of these relationships depends importantly on
whether the institutional setup of the securitisation process preserves the dis-
ciplinary power of market forces. Indeed, market participants have sought to
devise contractual features and institutional arrangements to address these
issues. Still, events leading into the crisis suggest that, despite these e⁄orts,
incentive problems can accumulate within the securitisation process and that
adjustments may have to be made to avoid similar problems in the future.
One proposal that has gained recent attention in this context is tranche
retention. Under such an arrangement, the originator or arranger of a se-
curitised instrument would be required to have some ￿skin in the game￿in
order to maintain the appropriate incentives to screen and monitor borrow-
ers. Equity tranche retention, in particular, has been advanced as a measure
to revitalise securitisation markets in the wake of the ￿nancial crisis.4
The public sector has also taken note. The International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (see IOSCO, 2009) has recommended that regulators
should "consider requiring originators and/or sponsors to retain a long-term
economic exposure to the securitisation." The European Union has adopted a
proposal requiring originators to hold at least 5% of the securitised portfolio,
where the form of retention may be chosen from among a list of options,
including a percentage share, or "vertical slice".5 The U.S. is also considering
3The tranching process creates classes of securities with di⁄erent levels of credit quality
from the underlying collateral asset pool. This is accomplished through the use of credit
support speci￿ed within the transaction structure, with the priority ordering of payments
being a key example: the equity/￿rst-loss tranche absorbs initial losses up to the level
where it is depleted, followed by mezzanine tranches which absorb some additional losses,
again followed by more senior tranches. See Fender and Mitchell (2005) and CGFS (2005)
for details.
4See Franke and Krahnen (2008) and Hellwig (2008) for recent examples. In fact, in
early securitisations, originators would routinely hold on to the equity piece of their trans-
actions. Over time, however, investors appeared￿ rightly or wrongly￿ to become more
comfortable with securitised instruments, leading to an active market in equity tranches.
5The options include: "5% of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or trans-
ferred to the investors" (i.e., vertical slice); "retention of randomly selected exposures,
equivalent to no less than 5% of the nominal amount of the securitised exposures, where
these would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation provided that the num-
ber of potentially securitised exposures is not less than 100 at origination"; "retention
of the ￿rst loss tranche and, if necessary, other tranches having the same or more severe
risk pro￿le and not maturing any earlier then those transferred or sold to investors, so
that the retention equals in total not less than 5% of the nominal value of the securitised
exposures." (See Article 122a, European Parliament, 2009)
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2a retention proposal (see U.S. Treasury, 2009).
This paper aims to contribute to these ongoing discussions. In particu-
lar, it examines the power of di⁄erent contractual mechanisms to in￿ uence
an originator￿ s choice of costly e⁄ort to screen borrowers when the originator
plans to securitise its loans. The question addressed is whether some mech-
anisms lead to more screening than others, and under what conditions. We
focus on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds the equity tranche
of a structured ￿nance transaction; the originator holds a ￿vertical slice￿of
the portfolio (a share of the entire portfolio without subordination features);
and the originator holds the mezzanine tranche rather than the equity piece
of a securitisation. The analysis illlustrates that the type of contract used to
align incentives will a⁄ect the amount of screening that the originator will
undertake.
The di⁄ering screening incentives generated by di⁄erent mechanisms de-
rive in large part from the varying sensitivities of the retention mechanisms
to a systematic risk factor, which plays an important role in the determina-
tion of borrowers￿default probabilities and asset values. In fact, the equity
tranche can be shown to be more sensitive to the realisation of systematic
risk than the entire portfolio.6
When the probability of an unfavourable realisation of the systematic
factor is high, and when the equity tranche would be exhausted if this un-
favourable realisation were to occur, the originator holding the equity tranche
may have less incentive to exert screening e⁄ort than the originator holding
a mezzanine tranche of equal "thickness" (i.e., identical percentage of overall
pool size) or a vertical slice of the loan portfolio.7 We nevertheless show
that, whereas a vertical slice may dominate the equity tranche in this case,
the slice would generally have to be quite "thick" to dominate both the eq-
uity and the mezzanine tranches. Hence, in our setting it is rather unlikely
that retention schemes relying on vertical slices would give rise to an optimal
incentive mechanism. Until now it has not been common practice to observe
the originator holding the mezzanine tranche, as the equity tranche, which
imposes the most risk on the originator, was generally believed to be more
"high-powered" in in￿ uencing incentives.
If the probability of a favourable realisation of the systematic factor is
high, then having the originator hold the equity tranche will tend to result in
6See Krahnen and Wilde (2006) for a discussion of this point. Fender et al (2008) make
a similar point in the context of ratings for collateralised debt obligations.
7The result regarding the vertical slice contrasts somewhat with the idea that the
tranching of asset-backed securities can help to solve problems of adverse selection (see,
e.g., DeMarzo, 2005). Indeed, going into the crisis, structured ￿nance transactions were
much more commonly observed than "pass-through" securitisations with no tranching.
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3greater e⁄ort than with either a mezzanine tranche or a vertical slice. In this
respect, the equity tranche appears to be a good "fair weather" device. If, in
addition, the costs of screening are not too high or if the unfavourable state of
the world is unlikely to be severe enough to exhaust the equity tranche, then
having the originator hold the equity tranche provides very high-powered
incentives. Namely, in this case the originator will exert the ￿rst-best level
of e⁄ort; i.e., the same level as it would if it were to hold the entire portfolio
on its balance sheet.
Finally, we ask whether allowing the originator to choose the retention
mechanism in the absence of any constraints would lead to a choice of mech-
anism that results in screening e⁄ort lower than the ￿rst-best level. The
originator￿ s choice of mechanism will be in￿ uenced by the monetary bene-
￿ts the originator receives from securitisation. Some of these bene￿ts are
indirect and "private", and we show they can indeed lead to a choice of re-
tention mechanism that results in lower than ￿rst-best screening e⁄ort. This
suggests a potential role for regulation in in￿ uencing the choice of retention.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
overview of the related literature. Section 3 sets out the model and compares
the e⁄ort choices associated with di⁄ering retention mechanisms. Section 4
discusses the results and provides numerical examples which illustrate the
impact of various parameters on the outcomes. Section 5 analyses the origi-
nator￿ s choice of retention mechanism. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The two papers most closely related to ours are Chiesa (2008) and Innes
(1990). Chiesa analyses the impact of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT)
activity at the portfolio level on a bank￿ s monitoring of its borrowers and on
the size of the bank￿ s loan portfolio. In her setup, information conveyed by
di⁄erent portfolio cash ￿ ows can be used to determine if the bank has mon-
itored or not. The realisation of a systematic risk factor plays an important
role in communicating this information. Chiesa ￿nds that a particular form
of CRT contract ￿ namely, one where the bank sells the portfolio together
with a put option on the portfolio to outside investors ￿ maximizes the size
of the loan portfolio for which the bank ￿nds it incentive compatible to mon-
itor. While this paper provides a unique view of the potential role of CRT
for banks in alleviating incentive problems, it does not focus on questions
relating to typically observed forms of CRT contracts or on recent concerns
5
4about portfolio securitisation that have preoccupied many observers.8
Chiesa￿ s result that a CRT contract, rather than debt, is optimal for the
bank stands in contrast to the optimality of the standard debt contract found
by Innes (1990), who formalizes intution in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
analyzes the optimal form of external ￿nance when an entrepreneur with
limited liability can exert e⁄ort to increase its pro￿t. Innes ￿nds that when
the payout to the investor is constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, then having the entrepreneur issue a standard debt contract
is optimal. Part of the explanation for the di⁄erence in Chiesa￿ s results from
Innes￿is related to the question of whether the pro￿t distribution satis￿es the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), which Innes (1990) assumes.9
The model of our paper resembles in certain respects that of Innes. Hav-
ing the originator in our model hold the equity tranche of a securitisation
would be similar to having the entrepreneur in Innes￿model hold equity and
obtain outside ￿nancing through debt. Similarly, having the originator in
our model hold a mezzanine tranche would be analogous to the entrepreneur
in Innes￿model holding debt, with the outside investors holding equity. Un-
like Innes (but similarly to Chiesa), our return distribution does not satisfy
MLRP.10 This feature gives rise to situations where the originator will ex-
ert less screening e⁄ort when it holds the equity tranche than when it holds
the mezzanine tranche. At the same time, certain private bene￿ts obtained
through securitisation can encourage the originator to use retention schemes
that result in too little screening e⁄ort. This provides a justi￿cation for
asking whether an improvement could be achieved by using regulation to
in￿ uence the originator￿ s choice of retention scheme.
Another paper dealing with the optimality of debt contracts in the context
8Several previous authors have found potentially negative e⁄ects of instruments of credit
risk transfer (single-name, rather than portfolio) on the incentives of loan originators. See,
for example, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Morrison (2005), Parlour and Plantin (2007),
and Parlour and Winton (2007). Ki⁄ et al (2003) present a general discussion of the
ways in which CRT instruments alter problems of asymmetric information and incentives
between loan originators and borrowers.
9MLRP implies that the relative likelihood of a high realisation of revenue given a high
e⁄ort increases with the level of revenue (i.e., the likelihood ratio increases with the level
of revenue). Assuming MLRP, it can be shown that Innes￿result regarding the optimality
of debt ￿nancing also survives in more complex dynamic settings that allow for contract
renegotiation under risk aversion. See Dewatripont et al (2003).
10The role of the systematic risk factor in our model leads to the outcome that, although
higher levels of e⁄ort will lead to higher expected revenue realisations given the state of
nature, high systematic factor realisations can lead to high realisations of revenue even for
low levels of e⁄ort. MLRP is thus violated. This outcome highlights the potential lack
of realism, at least in some settings, of assuming MLRP (which would essentially rule out
multi-modal return distributions).
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5of asset securitisation is that of DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), who consider a
situation where a ￿nancial institution would like to sell asset-backed securities
to raise cash but where the institution has private information regarding
the assets￿cash ￿ ows. These authors ￿nd that, under some rather general
technical conditions, the institution will choose to securitise by issuing a
standard debt contract to outside investors; i.e., the originator will hold the
equity "tranche" of the securitisation.11
In a spirit similar to that of our model, Du¢ e (2008) cites results from a
numerical simulation illustrating the impact of equity tranche retention on an
originator￿ s monitoring/screening e⁄ort, when the originator uses securitisa-
tion to raise cash and when the monitoring e⁄ort reduces borrowers￿default
probabilities. The originator chooses the thickness of the equity tranche as
well as the level of e⁄ort. Thicker equity tranches result in higher e⁄ort,
and therefore, in a higher value for the senior tranches ("debt") that are
sold to outside investors. On the other hand, thicker equity tranches reduce
the amount of asset-backed securities that can be sold and, consequently,
the extent to which the originator can generate cash. We explicitly model
this tradeo⁄ and ￿nd that in certain cases the originator may prefer thin
equity tranches, or even no tranche retention at all, to holding thicker equity
tranches. However, the thin tranche or no tranche retention will lead to levels
of e⁄ort that are below the ￿rst-best level.
3 Model
Our model focuses on an originating institution that extends loans, while
having the option to either carry these loans on balance sheet or pass them on
to competitive, third-party investors in the form of a securitisation. Suppose
that the originator has an amount Z in funds and extends Z loans of value
one unit each.12 The risk-free rate of interest is normalized to zero, and
outside investors as well as the originator are assumed to be risk-neutral. If
11Mitchell (2005) provides a review of the literature on ￿nancial contracting and security
design and its implications for the economics of structured ￿nance markets, including
questions relating to the optimality of pooling and tranching the cash ￿ ows from asset-
backed securities.
12Because we are concerned with the originator￿ s incentives to screen borrowers for a
given portfolio size, we do not model the originator￿ s choice of size of the loan portfolio.
Note also that, although the model focuses on the incentives of originators in screening
to-be-securitised assets, it could also apply to the incentives of arrangers with regard to
their screening of the activities of the originators and the quality of the securitised assets.
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6a loan does not default, it repays R > 1 to the originator.13 If a loan defaults,
recovery is zero.
Borrowers are assumed to be of two types: good (G) and bad (B), where
the types are distinguished by di⁄ering probabilities of default. The propor-
tion of type-G borrowers in the population is given by ￿ and the proportion
of type-B borrowers is (1 ￿ ￿). The loans of type-B borrowers are assumed
to have negative present value. Therefore, if the originator believes that it is
facing a borrower of type B, it will not extend a loan.
The originator cannot distinguish G from B types without screening. At
the same time, screening does not allow the originator to identify borrower
types with certainty. Instead, e⁄ort (unobservable to outsiders) exerted by
the originator in screening borrowers is assumed to reduce Type II errors (i.e.,
accepting a type-B borrower) and, therefore, the proportion of B borrowers
in the loan portfolio relative to no screening. The per-loan cost of screening
to the originator is given by a function c(e), where e 2 [0;1], with c(0) = 0,
c0(e) > 0, and c00(e) > 0.14
Screening e⁄ort is assumed to alter the composition of the portfolio as
follows:
Proportion of type-B borrowers: ￿B(e) = max[(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ e;0]
Proportion of type-G borrowers: ￿G(e) = min(￿ + e;1).
Note that @￿B(e)=@e = ￿1 and @￿G(e)=@e = 1 for e 2 [0;1 ￿ ￿]. Given
that screening e⁄ort is costly, the originator will never choose an e⁄ort level
that exceeds 1 ￿ ￿.
Borrowers￿PDs are a⁄ected by the realisation of a systematic risk factor
Y 2 fH;Lg, where H denotes a "high" or favourable state of the world and
L denotes a "low" or unfavourable state. Y = L with probability pL and
Y = H with probability pH = (1￿pL). Probabilities of default for each type
of borrower depend upon the state of the world in the following ways. In
the low state, type-B borrowers default with certainty and type-G borrowers
default with some probability PDG(L) > 0. In the high state, no type-G
borrowers default; however, type-B borrowers default with some probability
PDB(H) > 0. Like Chiesa (2008), we assume that the loan portfolio is
13We assume that there is imperfect competition among originators and that they can
extract enough rent from borrowers to give the originator an expected return greater than
the risk-free return.
14Screening cost functions are often speci￿ed as costs per loan applicant. Here, since
the size of the loan pool is ￿xed, we can specify the cost function as cost per loan. For
example, when screening e⁄ort is very low, Type-II errors are high; therefore, fewer type-B
loan applicants are rejected. As screening e⁄ort increases, more type-B loan applicants
are rejected; therefore, more loan applicants must be screened in order to achieve the ￿xed
loan portfolio size, which is more costly.
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7highly granular (i.e., portfolio size Z is high enough), so that idiosyncratic
risk is fully diversi￿ed away. Outcomes are then centered on the means,
which depend upon the realisation of the systematic risk factor.
Our framework allows for the PDs for good and bad borrowers to vary
across states of the world. An indication of the value of screening in a given
state of the world is given by the di⁄erences in the PDs of bad and good
borrowers in that state. De￿ne these di⁄erences as ￿L = 1 ￿ PDG(L) and
￿H = PDB(H) ￿ 0: A value of ￿L > ￿H, for example, would indicate that
screening e⁄ort has a greater impact in the low than in the high state. For
realistic values of PDG(L) and PDB(H), ￿L is likely to exceed ￿H. One
can think of ￿L and ￿H as being similar to a measure such as the di⁄erence
between the spreads of broad indices of BBB and AAA bonds. This measure,
which tends to increase in downturns, is sometimes used in empirical work
as an indicator of systematic risk.15
In this section we compare the choice of e⁄ort by an originator when it
holds the entire loan pool on its balance sheet with the e⁄ort levels that would
be chosen when the originator securitizes the loans but retains a portion
of the securitisation through di⁄ering retention mechanisms. The question
addressed is: given a particular form of retention mechanism, what e⁄ort
level will the originator choose? This question implicitly supposes that the
choice of retention scheme has been made at some prior point, either by the
originator in the absence of any constraints on that choice, or as a result
of regulation or pressure by market participants to use a particular form of
retention scheme. We use the results of this analysis to investigate in Section
5 the originator￿ s ex ante choice among retention schemes in the absence of
any constraints on that choice.16
3.1 Holding the entire pool
Suppose that the originator holds the entire loan pool Z on its balance sheet.
Assume, further, that the originator has assets other than this loan portfolio
on its balance sheet and that, even if a portion of the loan portfolio defaults,
the losses would not be high enough to lead to default by the originator on
any debt ￿nance that it has. The originator￿ s expected return will be given
15See, among others, Fama and French (1989, 1993).
16The analysis of the originator￿ s ex ante choice requires the results of this section, as
it is necessary to know the ex post e⁄ects of each type of retention mechanism in order to
be able to choose between the mechansisms ex ante.
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￿pool(e) = pL [(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e)]Z
+pH [R￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e)]Z
￿c(e)Z ￿ Z (1)
The ￿rst expression in brackets on the RHS of (1) gives the originator￿ s
return if the low state occurs. In this state, all type-B borrowers default with
certainty, and the proportion PDG(L) of G-type borrowers are expected to
default. Loan returns will be zero for all defaulters. The proportion (1 ￿
PDG(L)) of type-G borrowers is expected not to default, in which case the
bank￿ s loan returns equal (1￿PDG(L))R￿G(e)Z, where ￿G(e) represents the
proportion of good borrowers in the pool. The second expression in brackets
gives the originator￿ s return if the high state occurs. In this state no type-G
borrower defaults; therefore the return associated with these borrowers is
R￿G(e)Z: A proportion (1￿PDB(H)) of type-B borrowers does not default,
which implies a return of (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e)Z.
Using the de￿nitions of ￿L and ￿H, Eqn (1) can be reexpressed as
￿pool(e) = R[pL￿L￿G(e) + pH ￿ pH￿H￿B(e))]Z ￿ c(e)Z ￿ Z:
The originator chooses screening e⁄ort to maximize its expected return.
This e⁄ort will be given by the F.O.C. of (1), which gives
c
0(ep) = R[pL￿L + pH￿H] (2)
The e⁄ort speci￿ed by the F.O.C. (2) represents the ￿rst-best e⁄ort choice,
which will be used as the benchmark throughout our analysis. Note that the
size of the loan pool Z does not appear in this expression. As this value plays
no role in our analysis of e⁄ort choice, we normalize it to 1 from this point
onward.
3.2 Securitising the entire pool
Securitisation provides the originator with cash prior to maturity of the loans.
This cash may be valuable to the originator for any number of reasons, in-
cluding extending new loans, meeting liabilities and the like. Note that in
perfect ￿nancial markets, the originator would be able to borrow against the
future cash ￿ ow from the loan portfolio. Therefore, there would be no extra
bene￿t to using securitisation to generate cash. However, in the presence
of imperfections such as asymmetric information, bankruptcy costs, and the
10
9separation of ownership and control, originators may ￿nd it costly to raise
external funds, in which case it will be valuable to the ￿rm to be able to
generate cash.17 To capture the monetary bene￿ts from securitisation in the
model, we multiply the cash generated from securitisation by a parameter ￿,
whose value is greater than one. We expect the value of ￿ to be institution
as well as instrument-speci￿c.
One of the reasons for the variation of ￿ across institutions and instru-
ments is that, in addition to the cash generated directly from the sale of the
portfolio (or some portion of it), securitisation can generate other, indirect
monetary bene￿ts for the originator; for example, freeing up capital or in-
creasing reported pro￿ts. Some of these are in fact "private" bene￿ts for the
originator. We explore the implications of the indirect bene￿ts of securitisa-
tion in Section 5, where we take explicit account of the potential variation
in the value of ￿ across instruments in our analysis of the originator￿ s choice
between di⁄ering retention schemes. In the current section, however, the
results are una⁄ected by any variation of ￿ across instruments; therefore, we
keep the analysis simple and hold ￿ constant for all retention schemes.
In terms of timing, we assume in this section that the originator has al-
ready decided at the point of loan origination whether the loan portfolio will
be securitised and in what form. Before origination of the loans, the origina-
tor issues securities backed by the portfolio.18 It then chooses its screening
e⁄ort, originates the loans, and conducts the securitisation transaction. We
assume that outside investors are competitive: the price they will pay for any
securitisation will just equal the expected value of their payments from the
securitisation. We also assume that investors cannot observe the originator￿ s
screening e⁄ort, nor can the state of the world be legally "veri￿ed". Hence,
neither e⁄ort nor the state of the world can be contracted upon. However,
in computing the expected payments from the securitised portfolio, the in-
vestors take into account the e⁄ort level they know the originator had the
incentive to choose.
Suppose now that the originator securitises the entire loan portfolio. Since
no loans are held on balance sheet, the only source of revenue will be the
cash from the securitisation. Denote this revenue by Ssec. The originator￿ s
17See, for example, the discussion in Froot et al (1993).
18Equivalently, one could think of the originator setting up a special purpose vehicle
to which its loans will be sold, and the SPV begins issuing securities of a certain form.
See, for example, the discussion in Fender and Mitchell (2005). As in DeMarzo and Du¢ e
(1999) and DeMarzo (2004), it is important that the originator commits to the form of
the asset-backed securities before it originates the loans. The form of the securities that
will be backed by the loans will in￿ uence the level of e⁄ort that the originator will choose
to screen borrowers.
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10expected pro￿t will then be given by
￿sec(e) = ￿Ssec ￿ c(e) ￿ 1: (3)
Since there is no recourse and investors cannot contract on e⁄ort, the origi-
nator has no incentive to exert any e⁄ort. It therefore chooses an e⁄ort level
of zero. As a result, securitisation with no retention by the originator causes
a lowering of the quality of its credit portfolio.19
Investors, anticipating this outcome, will be willing to pay a price equal
to the expected return from the portfolio, given the zero e⁄ort level. This
implies that Ssec will be given by:
Ssec = pL [(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(0)]
+pH [R￿G(0) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(0)]: (4)
As we will show in the next subsections, mechanisms involving some reten-
tion of the portfolio by the originator will generally lead to positive screening
e⁄ort.
3.3 Originator holds a proportion v of the portfolio
Suppose that the originator securitises its loans but holds a proportion v
(i.e., a vertical slice) of the portfolio on its balance sheet. This implies that
for any given amount Y of cash ￿ ows from the portfolio, the originator will
receive vY . Denote by Sv the amount that investors will pay for the (1 ￿ v)
proportion of the return on the portfolio. The originator￿ s expected payo⁄is
now given by
￿v(e) = ￿Sv + vpL [(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e)]
+vpH [R￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e)]
￿c(e) ￿ 1 (5)
which can be rewritten as
￿v(e) = ￿Sv + vR[pL￿L￿G(e) + pH ￿ pH￿H￿B(e)] ￿ c(e) ￿ 1:
19Note that this extreme, no-screening result is a consequence of our assumption that
this is a one-shot game. In practice, for example, reputation risk might be expected to
exert a level of discipline on the originator, especially if it plans to undertake repeated
securitisations. Yet, it is also clear that the self-disciplining role of reputation does not
necessarily always work, as documented in Frankel (2009) on the basis of a case study of
New Century Financial.
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11On this basis, the originator￿ s e⁄ort will be determined by the F.O.C.:
c
0(ev) = vR[pL￿L + pH￿H]: (6)
Comparison of (6) and (2) together with the convexity of c(￿) reveals that
ev < ep. Thus, the originator exerts less e⁄ort when it holds a share of the
pool than when it holds the entire pool.20
3.4 Originator holds equity tranche
Now suppose that the originator issues a tranched securitisation. Assume
for simplicity that there are three tranches: an equity tranche, a mezzanine
tranche, and a senior tranche. Assume that the originator holds the equity
tranche with a thickness t. In other words, the originator will bear all losses
up to a proportion t of the portfolio, above which the mezzanine tranche
begins to su⁄er losses.
The originator will receive a payment Seq from the sale of the mezzanine
and senior tranches. Upon maturity of the loans, the mezzanine and senior
tranche holders will together receive pre-contracted payment in the total
amount of B1(t), where B1(t) = (1 ￿ t)R, unless loan losses are so high that
the portfolio cash ￿ ows are less than B1(t), in which case all of the portfolio
cash ￿ ows will be paid to the mezzanine and senior tranche holders. Note
that the payment B1(t) depends upon the thickness of the equity tranche: the
thicker is the equity tranche, the lower will be B1 and Seq. The originator￿ s
expected payo⁄ is now given by
￿eq(e) = ￿Seq + pL maxf[(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e) ￿ B1];0g
+pH maxf[R￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e) ￿ B1];0g
￿c(e) ￿ 1 (7)
where the dependence of B1 on t has been suppressed. Note that when the
low state occurs, as long as (1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e) ￿ B1 > 0, the originator
receives some positive payment. If, however, (1￿PDG(L))R￿G(e)￿B1 ￿ 0,
the equity tranche will be "exhausted" in the low state; i.e., the payment to
the originator will be zero. Similarly, if the high state occurs and R￿G(e) +
(1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e) ￿ B1 < 0, the equity tranche will be exhausted.
It will be useful to de￿ne the conditions under which the equity tranche is
exhausted in the low and the high states of the world, respectively, as follows:
20The intuition for this outcome is similar to that of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Innes (1990). Like Innes, the model here uses an ex ante choice of e⁄ort, as opposed to
Jensen and Meckling￿ s ex post choice of perquisites.
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12Condition LowEx: (1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e) ￿ B1 ￿ 0
Condition HighEx: R￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e) ￿ B1 ￿ 0
Note that the value of e chosen by the originator will play a role in
determining whether conditions LowEx and HighEx hold. In particular, the
lower the value of e, the more likely these conditions are to hold. At the
same time, it is straightforward to see that there will be values of e for which
condition HighEx no longer holds but LowEx continues to hold. In other
words, if both conditions hold for low values of e, as e is increased, the
equity tranche will begin to pay out increasingly positive returns in the high
state while it is still exhausted in the low state.
In order to reduce the number of cases that need to be considered in the
exposition, and without loss of generality, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: When e = 0, condition HighEx does not hold but con-
dition LowEx does hold. I.e.,
(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(0) ￿ B1 ￿ 0 < R￿G(0) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(0) ￿ B1:
This assumption implies that, even if the e⁄ort level is zero, the equity
tranche will not be exhausted in the high state; however, it will be exhausted
in the low state.21
De￿ne b e as the threshold level of e⁄ort such that condition LowEx will
hold for all levels of e⁄ort less than b e but will not hold for e⁄ort levels greater
than this value. I.e., b e satis￿es
(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(b e) ￿ B1 = 0: (8)
For all values of e⁄ort below b e, the equity tranche will be exhausted in the
low state, and for all values above b e, the equity tranche holder￿ s expected
21In principle, there are three possible cases to consider: (1) low e⁄ort levels cause the
equity tranche to be exhausted in both the low and the high states; (2) medium e⁄ort
levels cause the equity tranche to be exhausted in the low state but not in the high state;
(3) high e⁄ort levels imply that the equity tranche will not be exhausted in either state.
Assumption 1 e⁄ectively rules out the need to consider the ￿rst case, which simpli￿es
the exposition without changing any of the results. This assumption allows us to ignore
parameter values for which the equity tranche holder would not receive a payout in either
the high or the low state and is without loss of generality. In practice, rating agency (or
"market") requirements on minimum subordination levels would also e⁄ectively rule out
the ￿rst case.
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13payment in the low state will be positive. This has the following implications
for the marginal e⁄ect of a change in e⁄ort:
@￿eq(e)
@e
= pH￿HR ￿ c
0(e), for e 2 [0;b e] (9)
= R[pL￿L + pH￿H] ￿ c
0(e), for e > b e:
In words, for values of e < b e, an increase in e will have no impact on the
originator￿ s payment in the low state, but it will a⁄ect the payo⁄in the high
state. For values of e > b e, an increase of e⁄ort has an e⁄ect on the payo⁄ in
both states of the world.
The expressions above indicate that the marginal impact of e⁄ort on
the originator￿ s revenue is discontinuous at the value b e. Whether the orig-
inator￿ s optimal choice of e⁄ort will lie in the range [0;b e] or the range
e > b e will ultimately depend upon the value of c0(b e). In particular, if
c0(b e) > R[pL￿L + pH￿H], then the originator will choose an e⁄ort less than
b e. It is only in the case where c0(b e) < R[pL￿L + pH￿H] that the originator
will choose an e⁄ort greater than b e. This e⁄ort choice, then, will determine
whether the equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state.
The originator￿ s e⁄ort choice can thus be described by two possible cases.
Case E1: Condition LowEx holds at optimal e⁄ort.
Suppose that c0(b e) > R[pL￿L + pH￿H]. Then the optimal e⁄ort is given
by
c
0(e) = pH￿HR: (10)
De￿ne this level of e⁄ort as eeq: Note that the originator￿ s e⁄ort in this case
is determined solely by the the likelihood that the high state occurs and the
impact of e⁄ort in the high state (as measured by ￿H).
Case E2: Condition LowEx does not hold at optimal e⁄ort.
This condition can only hold if c0(b e) < R[pL￿L + pH￿H]. It follows that
c
0(e) = R[pL￿L + pH￿H]: (11)
Note that this level of e⁄ort is the ￿rst-best level ep. In this case ep > b e and
the equity tranche will have a positive expected payo⁄ in the low state.
Note that equity tranche thickness t does not enter into the ￿rst-order
condition in either of the two above cases; equity tranche thickness has no
direct e⁄ect on the originator￿ s e⁄ort choice. It does, however, have an
indirect e⁄ect. The thicker is the equity tranche t, the smaller will be the
15
14promised payment B1 = (1 ￿ t)R and the lower will be the threshold e⁄ort
b e. Therefore, the thicker is the equity tranche, the less likely is Case E1 to
hold at the optimum.22
The following proposition characterizes the optimal e⁄ort with the equity
tranche.
Proposition 1: (i) If Case E2 holds, then the originator exerts the same
amount of e⁄ort with the equity tranche as it would if it held the entire
portfolio on balance sheet; (ii) If Case E1 holds, then the originator￿ s e⁄ort
with the equity tranche will be lower than if the originator were to hold the
entire portfolio on balance sheet; (iii) If Case E1 holds, having the originator
hold a share v of the portfolio, with the value of v equal to equity tranche
thickness t, will lead to greater e⁄ort than having the bank hold the equity
tranche if
t >
pH￿H
pL￿L + pH￿H
;
(iv) Equity tranche thickness has an indirect impact on the originator￿ s
choice of e⁄ort: an increase in tranche thickness will lower the likelihood that
Case E1 holds.
Condition (i) of the above proposition re￿ ects the prevailing wisdom re-
garding the equity tranche: this tranche, which would represent a much
smaller claim on the portfolio than the entire portfolio itself, provides high-
powered incentives and gives rise to the ￿rst-best e⁄ort.
However, condition (ii) of the proposition suggests that the equity tranche
may not always provide such high-powered incentives. If, in equilibrium, the
equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state of the world, then the
originator will exert less e⁄ort with the equity tranche than with the entire
portfolio. Condition (iii) then suggests that the originator￿ s e⁄ort choice may
be higher if it holds a vertical slice of the portfolio rather than the equity
tranche. Comparison of the F.O.C. (10) associated with the equity tranche
and the F.O.C. (6) for a vertical tranche shows that a slice of size v will result
in higher e⁄ort than will the equity tranche if the following inequality holds:
v >
pH￿H
pL￿L + pH￿H
: (12)
This inequality suggests that if pL is high relative to pH, or if ￿L is large
relative to ￿H, the critical value of v needed for the vertical slice to dominate
the equity tranche may be fairly small. Setting the left-hand side equal to t
22Indeed, if the equity tranche were thick enough (e.g., close to 1), then condition LowEx
would not hold even for an e⁄ort level of zero.
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15and checking whether the inequality holds will indicate whether having the
originator hold a vertical slice of size t would lead to a higher e⁄ort than
having the originator hold the equity tranche of thickness t.
3.5 Originator holds the mezzanine tranche
Now suppose that rather than holding an equity tranche of thickness t, the
originator holds a mezzanine tranche of the same thickness.23 What will
the choice of e⁄ort be relative to the choice when the originator holds the
equity tranche? Having the originator hold the mezzanine tranche means
that outside investors now hold the senior and the equity tranches. The
originator will now have to make a payment B2 = (1 ￿ 2t)R to the senior
tranche holder. Then the originator will pay itself a payment Bmezz, and
the equity tranche holder, who holds a tranche of thickness t, will receive
the residual. If revenue is not su¢ cient to make the payment B2 to the
senior tranche holder, then the originator will receive no payment. If revenue
is su¢ cient to make the payment B2 to the senior tranche holder but not
su¢ cient to make a payment of Bmezz to the originator, then the originator
will receive the residual of revenue minus B2, and the equity tranche holder
will receive no payment. The originator￿ s expected payo⁄ is now given by
￿mezz(e) = ￿Smezz + pL minfmax[(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e) ￿ B2;0)];Bmezzg
pH minfmax[R￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e) ￿ B2;0)];Bmezzg
￿c(e) ￿ 1: (13)
Given that the payment structure for the various tranche holders is the same
as in the previous subsection (i.e., only the identities of the holders of the
tranches have changed), then Bmezz+B2 = B1. This implies that the thresh-
old e⁄ort b emezz below which the equity tranche is exhausted; i.e., for which
(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(b emezz) ￿ B2 = Bmezz, is equal to the previous threshold
e⁄ort b e, for which (1￿PDG(L))R￿G(b e) = B1. Note also that the originator
will now never choose an e⁄ort greater than b e, since for any e⁄ort greater
than b e, its payo⁄ does not increase with e⁄ort and will be equal to Bmezz.
In order to characterize the optimal e⁄ort we need to distinguish between
three potential cases.
Case M1: At the optimal e⁄ort, Case E1 from the previous section
holds (i.e., equity tranche is exhausted) but the mezzanine tranche is not
completely exhausted (i.e., (1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(emezz) ￿ B2 > 0).
23The assumption of the same thickness for the mezzanine tranche is made to allow a
more direct comparison between the alternatives of having the originator hold the equity
tranche and having the originator hold the mezzanine tranche.
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16Given that the originator will never choose an e⁄ort greater than b e (since
the mezzanine tranche holder always receives the constant payment Bmezz in
the high state of the world), the condition which implies that Case E1 holds
at the optimal e⁄ort is that c0(b e) > pL￿LR. In this case the optimal e⁄ort
emezz < b e, and
c
0(emezz) = pL￿LR: (14)
Case M2: Case E1 holds at optimal e⁄ort and the mezzanine tranche is
exhausted.
This case will occur if c0(b e) > pL￿LR and if at the value e for which
c0(e) = pL￿LR, (1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e) ￿ B2 ￿ 0. Given that losses are so
high with this level of e⁄ort that the mezzanine tranche will be exhausted in
the low state of the world, the optimal e⁄ort will be e = 0:
Case M3: c0(b e) < pL￿LR.
In this case, if the originator were to hold the equity tranche, it would
choose an e⁄ort high enough so that the condition LowEx does not hold (i.e.,
Case E2 would characterize the optimum). When the originator holds the
mezzanine tranche, it will choose the e⁄ort b e, and it will receive Bmezz in
both the low and the high states. Note, however, that in this case the equity
tranche is still exhausted in the low state.
We may now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2: (i) Suppose that condition (ii) of Proposition 1 holds;
i.e., the originator, if it holds the equity tranche, would choose an e⁄ort low
enough so that the equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state. Then
the originator, when it holds the mezzanine tranche, will also choose a level
of e⁄ort such that the equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state, and
this e⁄ort may be greater than the e⁄ort that the originator would choose if
it held the equity tranche.
(ii) Suppose the originator holds the mezzanine tranche and that Case M1
holds. Then having the originator hold a share v of the portfolio, with the
value of v equal to mezzanine tranche thickness t, will lead to greater e⁄ort
than having the bank hold the mezzanine tranche if
t >
pL￿L
pL￿L + pH￿H
:
(iii) Suppose that the originator holds the mezzanine tranche and that Case
M3 holds. Then the originator￿ s e⁄ort will always be less than the e⁄ort it
would have chosen if it were holding the equity tranche.
Proof: (i) When c0(b e) > R[pL￿L + pH￿H], condition (ii) of Proposition
1 holds. That c0(b e) > R[pL￿L + pH￿H] implies also that c0(b e) > pL￿LR.
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17So, the e⁄ort chosen by the originator holding the mezzanine tranche will
be strictly less than b e. The e⁄ort will be strictly positive and will satisfy
c0(emezz) = pL￿LR, as long as the mezzanine tranche is not exhausted in the
low state at this level of e⁄ort. Comparison of the F.O.C. for emezz with that
for eeq reveals that emezz > eeq if pL￿L > pH￿H. This condition will hold if
the likelihood of the low state occurring is high or if the impact of screening
is high in the low state relative to the impact in the high state.
(ii) The e⁄ort with a share v of the portfolio will exceed the e⁄ort with
the mezzanine tranche if
pL￿LR < v ￿ R[pL￿L + pH￿H]
or
v >
pL￿L
pL￿L + pH￿H
: (15)
(iii) In this case c0(b e) < pL￿LR, and the originator holding the mezzanine
tranche will choose emezz = b e. Given that c0(b e) < pL￿LR < R[pL￿L + pH￿H],
then if the originator were to hold the equity tranche, it would choose the
￿rst-best e⁄ort ep such that c0(ep) = R[pL￿L + pH￿H]. This implies that
the originator￿ s e⁄ort with the mezzanine tranche is lower than it would be
with the equity tranche. k
4 Discussion and numerical examples
The analysis above has derived conditions under which one type of mech-
anism may dominate another in providing the incentive for originators to
exert screening e⁄ort. Under what conditions might one of the mechanisms
dominate both other alternatives? Statement (i) of Proposition 1 provides a
partial answer to this question. When the equity tranche is thick enough so
that it will not be exhausted in the low state in equilibrium, then the equity
tranche will result in the ￿rst-best e⁄ort. However, if the equity tranche
would be exhausted in the low state in equilibrium (as in statement (ii) of
Proposition 1), then the e⁄ort chosen by the originator will be less than ￿rst-
best, and the mezzanine tranche or a vertical slice may yield higher e⁄ort
than the equity tranche.
4.1 Ilustration and discussion
The intuition for these results can be illustrated via Graph 2. The coloured
lines depict the payment pro￿les across di⁄erent retention mechanisms from
the investor￿ s and the originator￿ s perspectives. When the originator retains
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18the equity tranche of a securitisation (indicated by the red line in the right-
hand panel), he becomes the residual claimant with respect to the cash ￿ ows
from the underlying portfolio. The investor (for simplicity, the graph assumes
that there is only one combined mezzanine/senior tranche), in turn, holds a
claim that has the familiar properties of a standard debt contract (the red
line in the left-hand panel). That is, the investor will receive the entire cash
￿ ow from the underlying pool of assets up to the point where this cash ￿ ow
equals the promised payment to the mezzanine tranche holder. Only from
that level of cash ￿ ow onwards will the originator begin to receive payouts.
Mezzanine tranche retention by the originator works in a similar fashion
(with the payo⁄ pro￿les in the two panels reversed, as indicated by the blue
lines), while a share in the overall pool generates a linear payo⁄ pro￿le for
both the originator and investor (as suggested by the brown lines).
If a downturn is likely (pL is high) and the equity tranche is thin enough
to be depleted if the downturn materialises, then cash ￿ ows generated by the
asset pool will imply tranche payouts to the left of points A and B in both
panels of the graph. (This is our case E1 in Section 3.4.) In this region of
cash ￿ ows, an increase in the originator￿ s e⁄ort would have no impact on
its payo⁄ in the low state (although it would increase the payo⁄ in the high
state). This reduces the incentive to exert screening e⁄ort. In contrast, if the
originator holds the mezzanine tranche, an increase in e⁄ort will increase the
payout in the low state (although it will have no impact on the payo⁄ in the
high state). If the originator holds the vertical slice, an increase in e⁄ort will
increase the payout in both the low and the high states. Hence, depending
upon parameter values, either the mezzanine tranche or the vertical slice may
dominate equity tranche retention.
The more standard case of equity tranche domination arises for relatively
high cash ￿ ow realisations to the right of A and B, which correspond to
situations where the equity tranche is ￿thick￿enough not to be exhausted in
the downturn (which corresponds to Case E2 in Section 3.4).
Note that these results contrast with the main result of Innes (1990),
which would imply in our context that it should always be optimal to have
the originator hold the equity tranche. The reason for this di⁄erence is that
the return distribution in our model does not satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP). This property is assumed to hold in Innes￿model,
as in much of the ￿nancial contracting literature.
The violation of MLRP for the return distribution in our model is due to
the role of the systematic risk factor. Whereas in our model the loan portfolio
return distributions in the low state and in the high state each satisfy MLRP
individually, when these two return distributions are "linked" via the sys-
tematic risk factor, the resulting distribution does not satisfy MLRP. Stated
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19di⁄erently, a high return on the portfolio can arise from a favourable reali-
sation of the systematic factor rather than high e⁄ort. Hence, in principle,
a low e⁄ort combined with a favourable realisation of the systematic factor
can result in higher portfolio returns than a high e⁄ort combined with an un-
favourable realisation of the systematic factor.24 The fact that MLRP does
not hold in this setting suggests that the assumption of MLRP as a technical
regularity condition for return distributions (at least on loan portfolios) may
actually be too strong.
We investigate below the conditions for which one retention mechanism
would dominate the other two. The condition for a vertical slice to dominate
the equity tranche is given by Eqn. (12) and allows us to de￿ne a threshold
value vequity as follows:
vequity =
pH￿H
pL￿L + pH￿H
:
When the equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state of the world, all
vertical slices of size vequity or greater will result in higher levels of e⁄ort than
will the equity tranche.
Similarly, equation (15) provides the condition for which a vertical slice
would dominate the mezzanine tranche. De￿ne the threshold value vmezz by
vmezz =
pL￿L
pL￿L + pH￿H
:
All vertical slices of size vmezz or greater will yield higher e⁄ort than the
mezzanine tranche.
A vertical slice of size v will then dominate both the equity tranche and
the mezzanine tranche (assuming that the equity tranche would be exhausted
in the low state) only if
v > max[vequity;vmezz]:
This condition suggests that in our setting it is rather unlikely that a vertical
slice will dominate both the equity tranche and the mezzanine tranche, unless
v represents a relatively high proportion of the portfolio.
24Our results can be illustrated in the context of Innes￿model as follows. Consider
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t distribution and the optimal (monotonic) debt contract of Innes. Now
assume that a systematic risk factor exists and that the current pro￿t distribution is the
distribution that would hold in the High state. Suppose, further, that the Low state is
severe enough so that the equity the entrepreneur holds will have a zero payo⁄in this state
(i.e., the maximum realisation of pro￿t is too low to repay the investor in full). Then, it is
possible to show that having the entrepreneur issue equity instead of debt to the outside
investor, with the entrepreneur holding a standard debt contract, may result in a higher
level of e⁄ort than having the entrepreneur issue a debt contract and retain equity.
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20We may also ask when the mezzanine tranche would dominate the equity
tranche (still assuming that condition LowEx holds). Comparison of the
F.O.C.s (10) and (14) reveals that the mezzanine tranche would dominate
the equity tranche if
pL￿L > pH￿H:
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality is also implied by the ratio
vmezz=vequity > 1. Hence, comparison of the values of vmezz and vequity will
reveal whether the mezzanine tranche would dominate the equity tranche.
4.2 Numerical examples
Tables 1-3 provide numerical illustrations of important parameters and rela-
tionships in our model. We have chosen a set of baseline parameter values
and we examine the impact of successively varying some of the parame-
ter choices. Our baseline parameter values are as follows: pH = pL = 0:5;
￿ = 0:6; PDG(L) = PDB(H) = 0:05; t = 0:15; B1 = (1￿t)R; B2 = (1￿2t)R;
Bmezz = tR.
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between equity tranche thickness and
the critical e⁄ort b e, below which the equity tranche would be exhausted in
the low state. The level of b e relative to the maximum level of e⁄ort the
originator would ever choose gives some indication of the relative likelihood
that in equilibrium the equity tranche will be exhausted in the low state.
The table reports the critical value b e in the following way. Given that an
e⁄ort level of 0:4 is the maximum e⁄ort level that the originator would ever
choose (since ￿ = :6 in this example, and the originator will never choose an
e⁄ort greater than (1 ￿ ￿)), if the value of b e exceeds 0:4, we simply report it
as 0:4, since any higher value is irrelevant. In the ￿rst column of this table,
all parameter values are held at their baseline values except equity tranche
thickness t. The entries in the ￿rst column show that thin tranches (i.e.,
of thickness less than or equal to 0.05) would result in a value of b e = 0:4.
Thus, very thin equity tranches would generate an outcome where the equity
tranche is always exhausted in the low state. As equity tranche thickness
increases, the value of b e decreases, implying that for choices of e⁄ort level
high enough, the equity tranche would not be exhausted in the low state. For
very thick equity tranches (of 0.43 and higher in our example), the critical
e⁄ort falls to zero. Hence, for these very thick tranches the equity tranche
will never be exhausted in the low state, and the originator￿ s optimal e⁄ort
will always be the ￿rst-best level.
Examination of equation (8), which de￿nes the critical e⁄ort b e, shows
that the PD of good borrowers in the low state, PDG(L), also plays a role in
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21determining b e. Namely, as PDG(L) increases, the value of b e also increases.
An increase in PDG(L) can be interpreted as an increase in the severity of
the low state of the world. (Recall that bad borrowers default with certainty
in the low state.) Furthermore, an increase in PDG(L) translates into a
decrease in the di⁄erence ￿L between the PDs of the bad and the good
borrowers in this state. In other words, an increase in the severity of the low
state will imply that screening e⁄ort has less of an "impact", since the PDs
of good borrowers are now closer to those of bad borrowers. The diminished
impact of screening will imply that more screening e⁄ort will now have to be
exerted in order for the equity tranche not to be exhausted; i.e., the value of
b e increases.
Table 1 also illustrates the impact of a change in PDG(L) on b e. The rise in
b e as PDG(L) increases (subject to the maximum e⁄ort level of 0.4) is readily
visible. However, the table also illustrates that as PDG(L) rises, increasingly
thicker equity tranches will be needed to ensure that the equity tranche is
not always exhausted in the low state; i.e., to ensure that b e is less than 0:4.
Consider, for example, the baseline values of t = 0:15 and PDG(L) = 0:05.
These values result in a value of b e equal to 0:295: If PDG(L) is increased to
0:15, then b e rises to 0:4. Tranche thickness would have to be increased in
order to ensure that there are any e⁄ort levels for which the equity tranche
would not be exhausted. For instance, increasing tranche thickness from 0:15
to 0:20 would lower the value of b e from 0:4 to 0:343.
Table 2 illustrates how the critical values vequity and vmezz change as the
probability of the high state, pH, changes. Table 3 in turn shows the impact
of changes in the probabilities PDG(L) and PDB(H) on these critical values.
These tables can be used to determine when a vertical slice or a mezzanine
tranche would dominate the equity tranche, assuming that the baseline equity
tranche of 0:15 results in a choice of e⁄ort low enough to exhaust the equity
tranche in the low state.
In particular, Table 2 indicates that a vertical slice of less than 15 percent
will begin to dominate the equity tranche for values of pL that are rather low.
Indeed, for a value of pL equal to 0.25 (pH = 0:75), a vertical slice of about 13
percent of the portfolio will dominate the equity tranche of 15 percent. On
the other hand, the size of the vertical slices needed to dominate a mezzanine
tranche of 15 percent are very high for all possible values of pH and pL. This
implies that only very thick vertical slices would ever dominate both the
equity and mezzanine tranches.
We can also examine the ratio vmezz=vequity to determine whether the
mezzanine tranche would dominate the equity tranche. Comparison of vmezz
and vequity reveals that the mezzanine tranche would dominate the equity
tranche for all values of pH ￿ 0:95.
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22Table 3 reports the values of vmezz and vequity as PDG(L) and PDB(H)
vary. To keep the example tractable, we have set PDG(L) = PDB(H). As
these values increase, the di⁄erence between ￿L and ￿H decreases. For
example, when PDG(L) = PDB(H) = :05, ￿L ￿ ￿H = :9, and when
PDG(L) = PDB(H) = :5, ￿L￿￿H = 0. The table also shows that when ￿L
is signi￿cantly greater than ￿H (i.e., when PDG(L) and PDB(H) are very
low), a very thin vertical slice can dominate the 15 percent equity tranche.
When PDG(L) and PDB(H) are at their baseline levels of 0:05, then a verti-
cal slice of ￿ve percent of the portfolio would dominate the 15 percent equity
tranche. On the other hand, when PDG(L) = PDB(H) = :5, it would take
a vertical slice of 50 percent to dominate the equity tranche.
Finally, examination of the value of vmezz in Table 3 reveals that a vertical
slice of 15 percent or less would dominate a mezzanine tranche of 15 percent
only for very high values of PDG(L) and PDB(H). As in Table 2, vertical
slices would generally have to be very thick to dominate a mezzanine tranche.
With respect to the question of whether a mezzanine tranche would dominate
the equity tranche, comparison of the values vmezz and vequity in Table 3
suggests that the equity tranche would dominate only for relatively high
values of PDG(L) and PDB(H), above 0:5.
These results illustrate that, as the probability of the low state rises and
as the impact of screening in the low state (￿L) increases, either the vertical
slice or the mezzanine tranche becomes more likely to dominate the equity
tranche. The more likely is a downturn to occur and the more valuable is
screening in the downturn, the less desirable will be equity tranche retention
relative to an appropriate share of the portfolio or to the mezzanine tranche
(if the equity tranche is likely to be exhausted in the downturn). The more
likely is an upturn, the more desirable is equity tranche retention relative to
the mezzanine tranche or the share of the portfolio. In this respect, we may
say that the equity tranche is an e⁄ective "fair weather" device. Thus, we
have a seeming paradox: the more likely is screening to be valuable, the less
desirable it may be to have the originator hold the equity tranche, or the
thicker the equity tranche must be in order for adequate screening incentives
to be created.
5 Originator￿ s choice of retention mechanism
In this section, we examine the originator￿ s choice of retention mechanism.
The aim is to determine whether the originator would ever choose a mech-
anism that would yield a level of screening e⁄ort below the ￿rst-best level.
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23This is important, in that to the extent that the originator would prefer re-
tention mechanisms that lead to low levels of e⁄ort, there may be a role for
regulation to play in restricting the choice of mechanisms.
As discussed in Section 3, the value ￿ of monetary bene￿ts of securiti-
sation is assumed to vary across institutions and instruments. In particular,
because of the indirect ("private") bene￿ts linked to factors such as capital
savings or compensation schemes, the value of ￿ can be expected to increase
as more of the portfolio is securitised (i.e. as the retained portion of the
securitisation diminishes).
For example, holding less of the loan portfolio on balance sheet frees up
capital, which can be re-employed in other activities. This adds to the direct
bene￿ts the originator obtains from the cash generated by the securitisation.
Another possible source of indirect ben￿ts is related to the design of com-
pensation schemes. If the compensation of managers is linked to short-term
pro￿ts (or revenues), then managers may prefer securitisation over loans held
on balance sheet, due to di⁄erences in the accounting or regulatory treatment
of securitisations versus loans. Securitisations typically involve front-loaded
recognition of revenues, including origination fees, while similar revenues for
loans held on balance sheet are typically recognized over the life of the loan.25
This may thus provide an impetus to securitise and to minimise retention.26
For these reasons, the value the originator attributes to ￿ is assumed to
be higher for full securitisation of the portfolio than for a transaction where
the originator retains a portion of the securitised assets, but in ways that
will depend on the nature of the securitising institution, the type of assets
in the collateral pool and the design of the securitisation.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We de￿ne a "thick" equity tranche as a
tranche with a thickness su¢ cient to give rise to the ￿rst-best e⁄ort ep from
Section 3. (In other words, a thick equity tranche yields an outcome that
corresponds to Case E2 considered in Section 3.4.) Similarly, we de￿ne a
"thin" equity tranche as a tranche which gives rise to an e⁄ort eeq < ep (or
an outcome corresponding to Case E1 in Section 3.4).
We ￿rst note that, given that cash from securitisation has greater value
than cash paid at maturity of the loan portfolio and given that the origi-
nator￿ s e⁄ort with a thick equity tranche is the same as when it holds the
entire loan portfolio on balance sheet, the originator will always prefer se-
25See, for example, the discussion in Goldman Sachs (2009).
26Even within a given institution, the value of generating bene￿ts through securitisation
(and, therefore, the incentive to securitise loans) can vary as a result of the accounting
and regulatory rules applied at the departmental level (e.g., investment banking versus
commercial banking division) or as a result of the compensation schemes of the individuals
making the lending or securitisation decisions.
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24curitisation with a thick equity tranche to holding the portfolio on balance
sheet. What must be determined is whether the originator would ever pre-
fer securitisation of the entire portfolio to securitisation with a thin equity
tranche or securitisation with a thin equity tranche to securitisation with a
thick equity tranche. If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then
there is a potential role for regulation.27
In order to answer these questions, we proceed as follows. We ￿rst identify
the originator￿ s preferred tranche thickness among all "thick" equity tranches,
then the originator￿ s preferred tranche thickness among all "thin" equity
tranches. We then compare the originator￿ s pro￿t when it holds the preferred
thick tranche versus the pro￿t with the preferred thin tranche. Finally, we
compare the originator￿ s pro￿t with the preferred thin tranche to the pro￿t
with securitisation of the entire portfolio.
5.1 Optimal tranche thickness for a thick equity tranche
Suppose that the originator is constrained to hold an equity tranche with
su¢ cient thickness so that the tranche will not be exhausted in the Low
state; i.e. such that Case E2 from Section 3.4 will hold in equilibrium and
the originator will choose the ￿rst-best e⁄ort ep. Given that the monetary
bene￿t of a unit of cash from securitisation is greater than one, the originator
will want to securitise as much (i.e., to retain as little) as possible. Therefore,
the optimal tranche thickness for the originator will be the lowest thickness
(i.e., the thinnest tranche) for which e⁄ort ep is still optimal. In addition,
given any tranche thickness t, the originator has an interest in promising
the mezzanine and senior tranche investors as high a payment as possible
(within the con￿nes of the de￿nition of the equity tranche). This, too, helps
to maximise cash from securitisation. The maximum amount B1 that can
be promised to the mezzanine and senior investors when the originator holds
the equity tranche with thickness t will be the amount R(1 ￿ t).
Denote the originator￿ s preferred thickness of a thick equity tranche by
tT. We can ￿nd the value of tT as follows. Recall from our discussion of
the condition LowEx in Section 3.4 that for any given tranche thickness t, a
27Note that, in order to determine whether the originator would ever prefer a mecha-
nism that yields less than ￿rst-best e⁄ort to holding the thick equity tranche (and therefore
whether there is a rationale for regulatory intervention), it is su¢ cient to show that there
are situations in which the originator would choose either securitisation of the entire port-
folio or securitisation with a thin equity tranche. It is not necessary in addition to consider
the mezzanine tranche or a vertical slice, since both of these mechanisms yield levels of
e⁄ort below ￿rst-best.
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25critical e⁄ort level b e(t) can be de￿ned by
(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(b e(t)) ￿ R(1 ￿ t) = 0: (16)
For any e⁄ort e ￿ b e(t) condition LowEx will hold and the originator￿ s opti-
mal e⁄ort will be below the ￿rst-best level of ep, while for any e⁄ort e > b e(t),
condition LowEx will not hold and e⁄ort will be ep. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4, the value of c0(b e) will determine whether the e⁄ort chosen by the
originator with the tranche t will be higher or lower than b e.
Consider a tranche thickness e t such that
c
0(b e(e t)) = R[pL￿L + pH￿H]:
The fact that c0(b e(e t)) just equals R[pL￿L + pH￿H] implies that b e(e t) = ep
and suggests that the originator￿ s optimal e⁄ort with an equity tranche of
thickness e t will be ep. However, given that ep = b e(e t) and by the de￿nition of
b e, we know that the equity tranche holder can never expect to receive any
income in the Low state if the e⁄ort chosen is b e. So, with a level of e⁄ort ep
in this case, the originator will only have a positive payout in the High state,
and its expected pro￿t with the equity tranche e t and an e⁄ort of ep would be
pH
￿
R￿G(ep) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(ep) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t)
￿
￿ c(ep);
which can be reexpressed as
pH [R ￿ R￿H ￿ ￿B(ep)] ￿ pHR(1 ￿ e t) ￿ c(ep):
As in Section 3.4, de￿ne eeq such that c0(eeq) = pH￿HR. The e⁄ort eeq is the
optimal e⁄ort choice when the equity tranche is exhausted in the Low state
but recieves a positive payout in the High state. By the de￿nition of eeq,
therefore, we know that the value of the above expression would be higher
with an e⁄ort level of eeq than with ep (or higher with e = 0 if R￿G(eeq) +
(1 ￿ PDB(H))(R￿B(eeq)) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t) < 0). Assume the former, so that eeq
would be the optimal e⁄ort in this case. In other words,
pH
￿
R￿G(eeq) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(eeq) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t)
￿
￿ c(eeq)
> pH
￿
R￿G(ep) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(ep) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t)
￿
￿ c(ep)
= pL
￿
(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(ep) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t)
￿
+pH
￿
R￿G(ep) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(ep) ￿ R(1 ￿ e t)
￿
￿ c(ep):
The above inequality shows that e t is not a tranche thickness that yields ep
as the optimal e⁄ort. Hence, this tranche is too thin to qualify as a "thick"
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26tranche. In order to ￿nd the thinnest tranche that can be classi￿ed as a
"thick" tranche (i.e., the preferred tranche thickness tT), we need to increase
tranche thickness above e t (i.e., reduce promised payment below R(1￿e t)), to
the point where the originator has the incentive to actually choose e⁄ort ep.
It su¢ ces to increase tranche thickness to the point where the originator is
just indi⁄erent between choosing eeq and ep:
To see thisn, note that any value of t > e t, b e(t) < b e(e t); hence, c0(b e(t)) <
c0(b e(e t)) = R[pL￿L + pH￿H]: The minimum thickness such that the origina-
tor would just be indi⁄erent between choosing eeq and ep will be the value tT
such that
pH
￿
R￿G(eeq) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(eeq) ￿ R(1 ￿ t
T)
￿
￿ c(eeq)
= pL f(1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(ep)g
+pH fR￿G(ep) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(ep)g ￿ R(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ c(ep):
The tranche thickness tT thus represents the preferred "thick" tranche for
the originator.
To simplify notation, denote pH fR￿G(e) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(e)g by
pH feg. (In other words, pH feg represents the cash ￿ ow from the portfolio
in the High state when the originator chooses an e⁄ort level of e.) Simi-
larly, denote pL f1 ￿ PDG(L))R￿G(e)g by pL feg. Then we can rewrite the
expression for the optimal thickness tT as follows:
pL fepg+pH fepg￿R(1￿t
T)￿c(ep) = pH feeqg￿pHR(1￿t
T)￿c(eeq): (17)
This expression will be useful in the comparison of the originator￿ s pro￿t
with the preferred thick tranche versus the preferred thin tranche.
5.2 Optimal tranche thickness for a thin equity tranche
Suppose now that the originator is constrained to hold an equity tranche
which is su¢ ciently thin so that the tranche will be exhausted in the Low
state; (i.e., so that Case E1 from Section 3.4 holds) and the e⁄ort will be eeq <
ep. As before, given the monetary bene￿ts of securitisation the originator will
want to securitise as much as possible; therefore, the preferred "thin" tranche
will be the thinnest tranche for which e⁄ort eeq is optimal. In order to ￿nd
this tranche, ￿rst consider a tranche thickness t￿ such that
R￿G(eeq) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(eeq) = R(1 ￿ t
￿):
The tranche t￿ is so thin that the expected cash ￿ ow from the loan portfolio in
the High state, even with an e⁄ort eeq, is just su¢ cient to cover the promised
28
27payment to the senior tranche holders. In this case, the payo⁄ to the equity
tranche will be zero in both the Low and the High states; therefore, the
originator￿ s pro￿t with the equity tranche t￿ would actually be ￿c(eeq): In
this case, the originator would choose an e⁄ort of zero. Hence, the equity
tranche t￿ is too thin to elicit positive e⁄ort by the originator.
In order to ￿nd the preferred tranche thickness among thin tranches, we
must increase tranche thickness above t￿ to the point where the originator is
just indi⁄erent between exerting zero e⁄ort and the e⁄ort eeq. This tranche
thickness is given by tt such that
pH fR￿G(eeq) + (1 ￿ PDB(H))R￿B(eeq)g ￿ pHR(1 ￿ t
t) ￿ c(eeq) = 0
or
pH feeqg ￿ c(eeq) = pHR(1 ￿ t
t): (18)
5.3 Comparison of the originator￿ s payo⁄with the op-
timal thin and thick equity tranches
Now that we have found the preferred thicknesses among all "thick" and all
"thin" tranches for the originator, we can identify whether the originator
would prefer retention of a thin tranche or a thick tranche by comparing the
originator￿ s pro￿t with the preferred thin tranche and the preferred thick
tranche. De￿ne ￿T as the value to the originator of generating cash through
securitisation where the orignator holds a thick equity tranche. The origina-
tor￿ s expected pro￿t with the preferred thick equity tranche will be
￿
TR(1 ￿ t
T) + pL fepg + pH fepg ￿ R(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ c(ep):
Let ￿t be the value of securitisation bene￿ts with a thin equity tranche. In
accordance with our discussion of the di⁄erences in ￿ across instruments, we
assume that ￿t > ￿T. The originator￿ s expected pro￿t with the optimal thin
equity tranche will be
￿
tpL feeqg + ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t) + pH feeqg ￿ pHR(1 ￿ t
t) ￿ c(eeq):
These two expressions illustrate the potential trade-o⁄s in choosing between
the thick tranche and the thin tranche. All else equal (i.e., given some ￿xed
level of e⁄ort e), the thin tranche will generate more cash, since the originator
retains a smaller proportion of the portfollio with the thin than with the
thick tranche. In addition, the thin tranche yields higher total monetary
bene￿ts for each unit of cash earned through securitisation than does the
thick tranche, which further reinforces the advantage of the thin tranche.
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28However, the originator will not choose the same e⁄ort with each retention
mechanism: a higher level of e⁄ort will be chosen with the thick tranche than
the thin tranche. The higher e⁄ort level with the thick tranche will result in
higher expected cash ￿ ows from the loan portfolio, which will increase cash
earned from securitisation. The thick tranche will yield greater pro￿t for the
originator if the higher cash ￿ ows due to the higher e⁄ort are su¢ cient to
compensate for the higher monetary bene￿ts generated from the thin tranche,
all else equal.
The originator will prefer the thick tranche if the pro￿t with the thick
tranche is higher (i.e., if the following expression is positive).
￿
TR(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ ￿
tpL feeqg ￿ ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t)
+pL fepg + pH fepg ￿ R(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ c(ep)
￿pH feeqg + pHR(1 ￿ t
t) + c(eeq) (19)
By Eqn. (18), the third line of (19) equals zero. We can also use Eqn. (17)
to rewrite the second line of (19):
￿
TR(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ ￿
tpL feeqg ￿ ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t)
+pH feeqg ￿ pHR(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ c(eeq):
Using (18) and rearranging gives
￿
TpLR(1 ￿ t
T) ￿ ￿
tpL feeqg
+(1 ￿ ￿
t)
￿
pHR(1 ￿ t
t)
￿
￿ pHR(1 ￿ t
T) (20)
The second line of (20) is negative for all values of ￿t > 1. With respect
to the ￿rst line of (20), it is straightforward to show, by using (17), that
pLR(1￿tT) > pL feeqg; therefore, the ￿rst line will also become negative for
a high enough di⁄erence in the values of ￿t and ￿T. So, for a value of ￿t
high enough relative to ￿T, the originator will prefer the thin equity tranche
to the thick equity tranche.28
5.4 Comparison of optimal thin equity tranche with
full securitisation of portfolio
Let ￿f be the value of ￿ when the full portfolio is securitised; i.e., when none
of the securitisation is retained. The originator will prefer the thin equity
28It can be shown that for values of ￿T and ￿t close to one, the thick tranche dominates
the thin tranche.
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29tranche to full securitisation of the portfolio if the di⁄erence in pro￿t between
these two options is positive, or if
￿
tpL feeqg + ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t) + pH feeqg ￿ pHR(1 ￿ t
t) ￿ c(eeq)
￿￿
f fpL f0g + pH f0gg > 0: (21)
Eqn. (17) implies that pH feeqg ￿ pHR(1 ￿ tt) ￿ c(eeq) = 0; therefore, the
above inequality will hold if
￿
tpL feeqg + ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t) ￿ ￿
f fpL f0g + pH f0gg > 0:
which can be rewritten as
￿
tpL feeqg ￿ ￿
fpL f0g + ￿
tpHR(1 ￿ t
t) ￿ ￿
fpH f0g > 0: (22)
We observe that pL feeqg > pL f0g. If we can show that pHR(1￿tt) > pH f0g,
then we can conclude that (22) holds for a small di⁄erence between ￿f and
￿t; however, for a di⁄erence ￿f ￿ ￿t high enough, the inequality will no
longer hold, and the originator will prefer full securitisation to the thin equity
tranche.
Claim: pHR(1 ￿ tt) > pH f0g.
Proof: Suppose that pHR(1 ￿ tt) ￿ pH f0g. Then, by Eqn. (17),
pH feeqg ￿ c(eeq) ￿ pH f0g
or
pH feeqg ￿ pH f0g ￿ c(eeq): (23)
Straightforward algebra shows that pH feeqg￿pH f0g = pHR￿H ￿eeq. Using
this in the above inequality gives
pHR￿H ￿ eeq ￿ c(eeq):
However, the convexity of the cost function c(￿), together with the fact that
c0(eeq) = pHR￿H, implies that c(eeq) < pHR￿H ￿eeq. Hence, the assumption
that pHR(1 ￿ tt) ￿ pH f0g leads to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
The fact that the originator may choose to hold a thin equity tranche
rather than a thick equity tranche, or to undertake full securitisation of the
portfolio rather than holding a thin equity tranche, demonstrates that in the
absence of any constraints on the originator￿ s choice, retention mechanisms
may be chosen that lead to e⁄ort levels below the ￿rst-best level. This
provides a potential rationale for regulation.
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Proper alignment of incentives in securitisation is likely to remain of key in-
terest in the coming years for market practitioners, policy makers, and aca-
demics alike, as markets struggle to recover from the fallout of the ￿nancial
crisis. With incentives now under increased scrutiny, it is likely that practi-
tioners and regulators will demand that originating institutions retain some
exposure to the assets that they securitise, or demand disclosure about such
retentions, in order to help align their incentives with those of investors. It is
important to note that this is not a new development. In the past, originators
often retained subordinated classes of securitised asset pools, while facing the
risk that investors might shy away from their loans if these were deemed to
be underwritten with lower standards than those of their competitors. Re-
tention practices, however, have changed across market segments and time,
and disclosures about those retentions have been informal at best, limiting
the availability and reliability of such information.
Importantly, tranche retention does not in and of itself assure that the
associated risk exposures are going to be retained. To the extent that liquid
secondary or derivatives markets exist, originators may be able (basis and
counterparty risk aside) to hedge part or all of the exposure from retained
tranches, or to sell these tranches altogether.29 This, then, can undermine
the incentive alignment that proponents of tranche retention are seeking,
unless reputation e⁄ects or warehouse risk (i.e., the risk from retention of
exposures until they are sold or hedged) act in a counterbalancing fashion.
As a result, it may be desirable to keep any retention requirements ￿ exible or
simply require disclosure of all relevant information regarding retention (e.g.,
size and position in the capital structure as well as any changes over time),
possibly combined with a third-party mechanism to validate such disclosures.
Keeping all this in mind, the model presented in this paper suggests that
retention of a stake in the securitisation is likely to improve the incentives
of those who are originating to-be-securitised assets or who are arranging
securitisations. Retention may thus represent a viable option to help restart
depressed securitisation markets. However, if the choice of how much to re-
tain and in what form is left up to the originator, the retention mechanism
chosen may well lead to suboptimal screening e⁄ort. Whether or not reten-
tion should be imposed by regulators or be left for the markets to sort out
is, nevertheless, a question that cannot be directly answered with our simple
model. Yet, what the model can do is to alert those supporting tranche reten-
29Note that the amended European Capital Requirements Directive will require that
retained positions be maintained on an ongoing basis, i.e. without being "subject to
credit risk mitigation, short positions or other hedge"; see European Parliament (2009).
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31tion that care must be taken in designing such retention schemes. Wrongly
designed retention requirements can inadvertently destroy the economics of
securitisations, at least in some market segments, which would further de-
press (rather then restart) activity in these markets. Again, this is an issue
that we do not address directly. However, we do show that the ￿dominant￿
form of retention (i.e., the form yielding the highest screening e⁄ort) is likely
to depend crucially on the speci￿c nature and characteristics of the securi-
tisation in question, as well as the state of the credit cycle. In other words,
there is no "one-size-￿ts-all" solution to tranche retention.30
Allowing investigation of some of the key factors driving tranche domi-
nance, our model suggests a number of simple ￿rules of thumb￿ : First, equity
tranche retention is not necessarily the most e⁄ective way to align incentives.
Retention mechanisms such as a mezzanine tranche or a vertical slice of the
portfolio can in some conditions generate higher screening e⁄ort. Second,
in order for equity tranche retention to be likely to dominate the retention
of other tranches, the equity tranche needs to be relatively unlikely (across
various levels of screening e⁄ort) to be completely depleted in unfavourable
states of nature; i.e., in downturns. Third, in order for this to be the case,
equity tranches need to be relatively thick and the probability of favourable
states of nature needs to be relatively high. Consequently, equity tranches
might be dominated by other retention schemes in economic downturns￿ a
re￿ ection of the ￿fair weather￿feature of the equity tranche discussed in the
previous sections. Finally, although a vertical slice may dominate either the
equity tranche or the mezzanine tranche, it is unlikely that a vertical slice will
dominate both of these alternatives unless the vertical slice is very thick.31
While our analysis has considered a range of realistic retention schemes,
we have not dealt with certain possibilities, such as covered bonds or repre-
sentations and warranties. Since covered bond exposures remain on balance
sheet and since the originator must use its other assets to cover any shortfalls
in promised cash ￿ ows from the covered bond exposures to outside investors,
the originator￿ s screening e⁄ort with covered bonds should be identical to its
30This result is important, as much of the existing literature on tranche retention (by
both academics and industry) has focused almost exclusively on retention or disclosure
schemes based on the equity tranche. See, for example, FitchRatings (2008) and Moody￿ s
(2008) for industry examples, in addition to the academic papers mentioned in Section 2.
31One of the motivations for the proposal of a vertical slice is to balance the originator￿ s
interests with those of investors across all tranches. Investors in di⁄erent tranches do
indeed have con￿ icting interests in certain dimensions. For example, equity tranche holders
prefer assets with higher default correlations and more backloaded default pro￿les than
do senior tranche holders. We nevertheless believe that these con￿ icts are likely to be of
second-order importance relative to the determinants of overall asset pool quality, which
is the focus of our model.
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32e⁄ort if it were to hold its loans on balance sheet. At the same time, using
covered bonds allows the institution to generate some up-front cash, although
the ultimate amount generated would depend upon regulatory (capital and
other) requirements linked to covered bond issuance. We would expect that
covered bonds (given the lack of credit risk transfer) would be more likely to
be used by institutions with relatively low values of the "securitisation value"
parameter Omega, as the indirect monetary bene￿ts from covered bonds are
likely to be lower than those from other securitisation mechanisms.
Representations and warranties, which can include promises to repurchase
loans in default, are likely to have an e⁄ect that is similar to that of having
the originator hold an equity tranche, since the originator bears the default
risk on a certain proportion of the loans. One di⁄erence, however, is that
representations and warranties introduce counterparty risk, which investors
do not face when the originator actually holds the equity tranche. This may
discourage investors from accepting representations and warranties in lieu of
equity tranche retention by the originator.
Finally, retention mechanisms ￿even when supported by mandatory dis-
closure requirements ￿may not be su¢ cient to guarantee that incentives
are aligned along the securitisation chain. As illustrated by our parameter
Omega, which captures the monetary bene￿ts of securitisation for the orig-
inator, a host of factors can in￿ uence the economics of securitisation from
the originator￿ s perspective. Accounting and regulatory features of securi-
tisation, together with remuneration systems in ￿nancial institutions, have
tended to generate ￿indirect bene￿ts￿to securitisation (going beyond those
related to funding) relative to holding loans on balance sheet. These indirect
bene￿ts are often ￿private￿rather than ￿social￿and can encourage origina-
tors to favour mechanisms with low (or zero) amounts of retention in order
to maximise these private bene￿ts.
On this basis, our model provides some indirect support for initiatives
that are currently under discussion to modify banks￿remuneration systems
and to adjust regulatory and accounting measures that have the e⁄ect of
making securitisation arti￿cially more attractive than other sources of fund-
ing. This could include, for example, changes to accounting standards that
would eliminate immediate recognition of gain on sale by originators at the
inception of securitised instruments. Similarly, capital regulation might be
adjusted to cover all originating institutions and to grant capital relief to
originators only to the extent that true third-party risk transfer has taken
place, for instance, reducing incentives to ￿sell￿securitisations to vehicles
such as SIVs with their implicit recourse to originators.
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37Table 1: Numerical examples— critical levels of effort (e)
Baseline results for different combinations of tranche width (t) and probabilities of default (PDG(L) = PDB(H)), keeping
all other assumptions unchanged
1,2
Tranche width Probability of default: PDG(L) = PDB(H)
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45
0.01 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.05 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.10 0.348 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.15 0.295 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.20 0.243 0.343 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.25 0.190 0.283 0.400 0.400 0.400
0.30 0.138 0.225 0.335 0.400 0.400
0.35 0.085 0.165 0.268 0.400 0.400
0.40 0.033 0.108 0.200 0.325 0.400
0.45 0.000 0.048 0.135 0.248 0.400
1 Baseline assumptions: pH = (1- pL) = 0.5; θ = 0.6; PDG(L) = PDB(H) = 0.05; PDG(H) = 0; PDB(L) = 1; t = 0.15; B1 = (1 - t)R; B2 =
(1 – 2t)R; and B mezz = tR.
2 Numerical results for the critical (highest) effort level e at which the equity tranche is going to be
exhausted in the low state of the world (ie, for which condition LowEx is just going to hold), given different values of tranche width.
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38Table 2: Numerical examples— critical values of vequity and vmezz
Baseline results for different state probabilities (pH = 1- pL), keeping all other assumptions unchanged
1
Probability pH vequity
2 vmezz
2 Probability pH vequity
2 vmezz
2
0.01 0.001 0.999 0.50 0.050 0.950
0.05 0.003 0.997 0.55 0.060 0.940
0.10 0.006 0.994 0.60 0.073 0.927
0.15 0.009 0.991 0.65 0.089 0.911
0.20 0.013 0.987 0.70 0.109 0.891
0.25 0.017 0.983 0.75 0.136 0.864
0.30 0.022 0.978 0.80 0.174 0.826
0.35 0.028 0.972 0.85 0.230 0.770
0.40 0.034 0.966 0.90 0.321 0.679
0.45 0.041 0.959 0.95 0.500 0.500
1 Baseline assumptions: pH = (1- pL) = 0.5; θ = 0.6; PDG(L) = PDB(H) = 0.05; PDG(H) = 0; PDB(L) = 1; t = 0.15; B1 = (1 - t)R; B2 = (1
–2t)R; and Bmezz = tR.
2 Numerical results for the critical (highest) levelof v at which the equity/mezzanine tranche is not going
to be dominated by a vertical slice of size v.
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39Table 3: Numerical examples— critical values of vequity and vmezz
Baseline results for different probabilities of default (PDG(L) = PDB(H)), keeping all other assumptions unchanged
1,2
PDG(L) = PDB(H) vequity
3 vmezz
3 PDG(L) = PDB(H) vequity
3 vmezz
3
0.01 0.01 0.99 0.50 0.50 0.50
0.05 0.05 0.95 0.55 0.55 0.45
0.10 0.10 0.90 0.60 0.60 0.40
0.15 0.15 0.85 0.65 0.65 0.35
0.20 0.20 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.30
0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25
0.30 0.30 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.20
0.35 0.35 0.65 0.85 0.85 0.15
0.40 0.40 0.60 0.90 0.90 0.10
0.45 0.45 0.55 0.95 0.95 0.05
1 Baseline assumptions: pH = (1- pL) = 0.5; θ = 0.6; PDG(L) = PDB(H) = 0.05; PDG(H) = 0; PDB(L) = 1; t = 0.15; B1 = (1 - t)R; B2 = (1
–2t)R; and Bmezz = tR.
2 As PDG(L) = PDB(H) rises, the differenceof ΔL and ΔH will fall monotonically.
3 Numerical results for
the critical (highest) level of v at which the equity/mezzanine tranche is not going to be dominated by a vertical slice of size v.
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